CVE Posture55/100
Known CVEs affect this server. Update dependencies before production use.
Analyzing package security…
Analyzing package security…
Package trust score
This server scores 45/100 (grade C). The biggest gaps are supply chain and attack history — fixing those will raise your score fastest. Evidence is partial (50% coverage): Live attack probe could not run: Handshake timeout. Lower coverage caps the score — re-run with runtime layers enabled for a stronger grade. Top recommendation: run a live probe (behavioral) and remove packages that trigger malware or egress signals (+~11 pts).
This server scores 45/100 (grade C). The biggest gaps are supply chain and attack history — fixing those will raise your score fastest. Evidence is partial (50% coverage): Live attack probe could not run: Handshake timeout. Lower coverage caps the score — re-run with runtime layers enabled for a stronger grade. Top recommendation: run a live probe (behavioral) and remove packages that trigger malware or egress signals (+~11 pts).
| Category | Score | Weight | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE Posture | 55/100 | 15% | +8 |
| Supply Chain & Malware | 46/100 | 20% | +9 |
| Supply Chain | 40/100 | 10% | +4 |
| Authentication | 55/100 | 8% | +4 |
| Transport Security | 60/100 | 5% | +3 |
| Tool Capability | 50/100 | 15% | +8 |
| Attack History | 45/100 | 15% | +7 |
| Response Hygiene | 50/100 | 10% | +5 |
| Mastyf AI Protection | 50/100 | 2% | +1 |
Known CVEs affect this server. Update dependencies before production use.
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Fix the issues above, then run a deep scan or publish from your mastyf.ai proxy for a maintainer-verified badge.
Trust score: 45/100 (live scan)
1 CVE(s) found
Unknown publisher
High-confidence malware or egress signals — do not use this package until reviewed.
Supply-chain signals need review — verify package name and publisher before trusting.
Only basic API-key auth is configured. OAuth or mTLS is stronger for production.
Uses local stdio transport (low network exposure) but no wire encryption if exposed remotely.
Some tools can modify data or run sensitive operations — tighten policy around them.
No attack data observed — static review only or no probe coverage.
Tool responses are not scanned for leaked secrets or PII — enable Response DLP.
Not proxied through Mastyf AI — no runtime policy enforcement or audit trail.
Plain-language findings from the security scan — fix these to improve your score.
The scan produced evidence from 50% of its runtime layers. Live attack probe could not run: Handshake timeout — so the differentiated runtime checks could not be verified and the score is capped until they run.
How to fix: Re-run the scan with a reachable live server and a successful behavioral install so egress and attack-probe layers produce data.
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5b72c3643bb990395103d396d62440db908b84769c904d4c14aa9b259f97807c) This @atom8n/-scoped package impersonates Anthropic's official MCP inspector (package.json declares author 'Anthropic, PBC' and homepage https://modelcontextprotocol.io, with bug tracker at github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector) while intentionally regressing the security fixes upstream added for CVE-2025-49596. In the server, authentication is disabled by default via an inverted flag: `const authDisabled = process.env.DANGEROUSLY_OMIT_AUTH!== "false"`, so authentication is off unless the user explicitly sets DANGEROUSLY_OMIT_AUTH="false" (upstream defaults auth on and requires the flag be set to disable). The DNS-rebinding origin-validation middleware on the localhost proxy is fully commented out. The proxy's createTransport reads `query.command` and spawns it via `StdioClientTransport({command: cmd, args, env})`. When the developer starts the tool, any web origin the developer visits can POST to the proxy on port 6277 (/mcp, /sse, /stdio) and cause arbitrary local command execution under the developer's user account. The package also references an out-of-tree script `.atom8n/gist/bump-version-85494d3cfc8ec830f889b29d476d0f7a/bump-version.mjs` that is not present in the tarball. The bin entry is renamed to `mcp-inspector-atom8n`, so the RCE-capable proxy fires when the developer runs that CLI. This affects this server and is reported by OSV/NVD.
How to fix: Update the affected package to the latest patched release.
http://10.1.1.22:5577 Detected by the static layer with medium confidence.
How to fix: Review the flagged evidence manually before trusting this package.
The server accepts tool calls without verifying who is calling. In shared or remote setups, attackers could invoke file or system tools directly.
How to fix: Add OAuth 2.1, API keys, or mTLS before exposing this server beyond localhost.
The server talks over local stdin/stdout — low network risk when run on the same machine, but no encryption if tunneled remotely.
How to fix: Keep stdio for local dev; use HTTPS/mTLS or Mastyf AI proxy for remote agents.
The runtime probe tried to start the server and probe it with attack payloads, but could not establish a live MCP connection: Handshake timeout. No attack observations were collected.
How to fix: Confirm the package starts an MCP server (some expose it behind a subcommand) and re-run a live probe.
Run a live probe (behavioral) and remove packages that trigger malware or egress signals
Switch to a trusted publisher package and enable dependency verification
Improve attack history score